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Abstract
Peru belongs to the club of Latin American countries which
recently declined to follow "orthodox" adjustment programmes
and implemented a "heterodox" policy package instead. The
orthodox approach involves stabilisation by drastic budget
cuts and monetary discipline, liberalisation of factor mar-
kets and the trade regime, whereas heterodox policies in-
clude strict price controls on factor and goods markets, an
expansionary monetary policy, import protection and multiple
exchange rates. Further, while orthodox measures entail a
shock therapy, heterodox measures are associated with a
gradualist approach.
This paper analyses the rationale for an heterodox medicine
in the Peruvian case. First, the performance of the Peruvian
economy in 1970 - 1985 is studied in an attempt to arrive at
a diagnosis of the central disease affecting economic policy
in Peru. The conclusion is that the mix of monetary, fiscal
and exchange rate policies chosen was inconsistent and that
this inconsistency seems to have contributed to serious im-
balances at both the macro- and microeconomic levels. The
inward-oriented industrialisation strategy followed by this
country offered the appropriate background for the develop-
ment of this inconsistency. This result, along with a criti-
cal review of the economic consequences of the Peruvian
Government's heterodox plan, leads to the conclusion that
this country could reap significant welfare gains from a
reform of the policy regime in the direction of orthodox
adjustment measures and a stronger world-market orientation.- Ill -
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The outcome of stabilisation and liberalisation programmes
implemented in Latin America during the seventies revealed
to economists and policymakers concerned with economic de-
velopment in the region the adverse consequences of incon-
sistent policy packages and a neglect of appropriate timing
and sequencing of individual policies (CORBO, DE MELO 1985).
When in the 1980s Latin American countries again faced ad-
justment problems a revision of these lessons was not really
necessary, in spite of the fact that the relatively easy ac-
cess to the international capital markets formerly enjoyed
by these countries had been dramatically reduced after the
debt crisis of 1982. The only noteworthy difference between
the 1970s and the 1980s seems to be that adjustment under
external restrictions additionally calls for a debt manage-
ment strategy which should be compatible with a coherent
stabilisation and liberalisation plan.
Moreover, attempts at stabilising and liberalising the eco-
nomy in other parts of the developing world, notably in
South-East-Asia, showed that the trade regime may also de-
cisively influence the outcome of such an economic pro-
gramme. South-East-Asian countries pursuing an outward-
oriented strategy of economic development succeeded both in
adjusting their economies and in maintaining, at the same
time, virtually unrestricted access to the international
capital markets regardless of the level of their accumulated
foreign debt.
Notwithstanding the lessons from the past, Argentina, Brazil
and Peru recently adopted a very unusual mixture of orthodox
and heterodox policies in order to control tripple-digit
inflation and reactivate their debt-ridden economies. The
policy packages consisted of heterodox stabilisationmeasures (price and wage controls) along with negative
liberalisation (higher tariff and non-tariff protection,
multiple exchange rates, negative real interest rates) and
orthodox measures (major devaluations, a commitment to cut
public expenditure and restrain monetary expansion). Another
orthodox feature of these- policy packages was that they were
implemented as part of a shock treatment and thus represent-
ed a departure from the earlier policies of gradualism .
While the Argentine and the Brazilian reforms (Plan Austral
and Piano Tropical, respectively) achieved disinflation at
rather low output cost only during the initial months of
their unprecedented policy regimes (HEYMANN 1987; CARDOSO,
DORNBUSCH 1987), the Peruvian version (implemented since
July, 1985) led to an above-average growth of real GDP (8.5
percent) in 1986 accompanied by a considerable reduction in
CPI-inflation (from 250 percent in July 1985 to an average
of about 60 percent in 1986). This paper sets out to analyse
the Peruvian experience focusing upon the impact of an
heterodox-orthodox policy mix on the development prospects
of a country pursuing an inward-oriented strategy of indus-
trialisation. The next section gives a picture of overall
economic development of Peru in the period 1970 - 1985
followed by an attempt to arrive at a diagnosis of this
country's main disease. In Section III the Peruvian Govern-
ment's view of the crisis and its response to it, the so-
called "New Economic Policy", are discussed and confronted
with the findings in the previous section. Finally, the last
section explores alternative policy options for Peru.
Although the adjectives "orthodox" and "heterodox" could
possibly be understood in several different ways, parti-
cularly within the Latin American context, in this paper
these words are being used following their usage in the
latest literature on Latin American macroeconomic policy
(see the References) and in research projects carried out
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (USA) and the
Centre for Econonic Policy Research (UK).- 3 -
II. Economic Development in Peru 1970 - 1985
1. Policy Background
Peru belongs to the group of Latin American countries which
in the fifties and sixties were attracted by the industria-
lisation philosophy disseminated by the Economic Commission
to Latin America (ECLA). This philosophy basically maintain-
ed that a country could accelerate the process of industria-
lisation and thereby insure itself against the risks of an
unstable international environment only by changing the ex-
isting pattern of economic incentives in such a way that the
available factors of production are channelled to the manu-
facturing sector. A further expansion of the already rela-
tively developed primary sector of the economy was assumed
to be incompatible with such long-run goals as sustained
growth, full employment and income distribution.
In the case of Peru liberal trade policies and favourable
world market conditions prevailing throughout the fifties
had contributed to successive booms in primary exports,
which not only improved this country's import capacity, but
also translated into an average rate of growth of real gross
domestic product of not less than 5 percent per annum. Es-
pecially the mining sector determined to a considerable ex-
tent Peru's role in the international division of labour as
a supplier of key minerals to the industrial countries. In
spite of such historical evidence in favour of free-trade
policies Peru nevertheless adopted the ECLA recommendations
in the late fifties and switched from an outward-oriented to
an inward-oriented trade regime. Since then Peru has been
pursuing an industrialisation strategy based on domestic
demand growth and foreign savings with only short-lived
interruptions.- 4 -
The incentives for rapid industrialisation implemented in
Peru primarily entailed a commitment of the government to an
expansionary fiscal and an active incomes policy supplement-
ed by an accommodating monetary policy. Value added derived
from domestic production of manufactures was artificially
increased through credit and other subsidies, and particu-
larly so by tariff and nontariff barriers to international
trade. Ceilings for the (nominal) interest rate were set at
convenient levels in order to foster investment in physical
capital. Firms adopting capital-intensive lines of indus-
trial production could import capital and intermediate goods
at a preferential (overvalued) exchange rate. These measures
were taken within the framework of a generally repressed
financial system (negative real interest rates and credit
rationing) and foreign exchange controls. On the other hand,
a subsidy-based promotion programme for non-traditional ex-
ports was initiated in 1968.
These policies, which can be associated with the Industrial
Promotion Law of 1959, were continued throughout the seven-
ties and eighties with only minor revisions. In 1970 a new
General Law of Industries reinforced the overall goal of in-
dustrialisation and gave the government a strong partici-
pation in economic activity. Several new public enterprises
were created and other, formerly private enterprises were
taken over by the state. This extended the state's direct
influence to such key industries as mining, oil, fish, steel
and communications. At the same time the Labour Stability
Law modified labour relations by automatically granting
tenure to all workers employed for more than three years on
a (formal) contractual basis. The government also intervened
in the labour market by decreeing increases in wages and
pensions for unionised and nonunionised private and public
sector workers.- 5 -
Other major changes in legislation occurring in the seven-
ties focused on property rights in industry and agriculture.
Reforms of industrial property aimed at securing workers a
higher stake in corporate profits and co-determination in
management affairs. Also, reforms were made to establish
labour-managed firms drawing on the Yugoslavian experience.
As concerns agriculture some 10 million hectares of land
were confiscated from latifundia and distributed to peasant
families. However, many of the favoured peasants never re-
ceived legal documents certifying the new ownership rights.
On the other hand, the government imposed tight controls
both on producer and consumer prices of agricultural pro-
ducts. Marketing boards were awarded monopoly rights to
trade selected products on the internal market, which in
part could also be imported at preferential exchange rates.
Since consumer prices never exceeded producer prices paid by
the marketing boards this policy had an important subsidy
element.
Although Peru joined the import-substitution club fairly
late by Latin American standards, actually at a time when
some of its pioneers, notably Brazil, were already tapping
new sources of economic growth and therefore turning to more
outward-looking policies, while still others, notably Argen-
tina, were clearly unable to cope with the mounting im-
balances both at the micro- and macroeconomic levels result-
ing from an excessive reliance on a small and stagnant do-
mestic market, she rather continued sticking to an inward-
looking strategy of economic development even in the first
half of the eighties. The only noteworthy liberalisation
effort undertaken from 1979 to 1982/3 and driven by an offi-
cial acknowledgement that the Peruvian strategy might lead
to unintentioned distortions did not go very far.- 6 -
2. Major Trends in the Performance of the Peruvian Economy
What impact did these policies have on the performance of
the Peruvian economy in the period 1970 - 1985?
The Peruvian economy achieved respectable growth rates of
real GDP of more than 4.5 % in the early seventies
(Table 1). After that the economy expanded at comparable
rates of GDP growth only in the years of liberalisation
(1979 - 1981) and in 1984. In the remaining years the rates
did not reach the 2 % benchmark and in two cases GDP con-
tracted in real terms. On average the rate of economic
growth decreased in the seventies and became negative in the
eighties; over the whole period 1970 - 1985 Peru grew at a
rate of 2 % p. a. With population growing at an average rate
of 2.4 % p. a. this meant a contraction of per capita income
of 0.4 % p. a. Positive per capita rates could be achieved
only in the early seventies and in the years of liberali-
sation.
The poor performance of the Peruvian economy after 1975
with the exception of the short liberal intermezzo from 1979
to 1982 - culminated in a substantial decrease in real in-
come per capita in 1983. Not surprisingly, investment behav-
iour fits quite well into the picture drawn by GDP evolu-
tion: expansion took place in the first half of the seven-
ties and then again during the said attempt at liberalisa-
tion; thereafter only negative rates prevailed. The pattern
The analysis in this paper focuses on the rates of change
of key economic indicators, in order to detect policy
shifts and trends. Since both positive and negative rates
matter, log-changes were preferred to relative changes.
As is widely known, an important advantage of the log-
change over the relative change is its symmetry (regard-
less of the sign) with respect to the direction of
change. In contrast, the rate of relative change neces-
sary to attain the original level of a variable which has
increased differs from the rate of relative change res-
ponsible for this increase.- 7 -















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Data: Instituto Nacional de Planificaci6n. Direcci6n General de Planificacidn Econ6iica, Series Esta-
dlsticas Kacroecon6micas Peru: 1970 - 1985, Lima, September 1986; own calculations.- 8 -
of investment went hand in hand with expanding consumption,
particularly government consumption. The share of total con-
sumption in GDP, already considerable in 1970 (69.9 %), in-
creased to 72.1 % in 1985.
Imports closely tracked the evolution of GDP and investment
but at rather low levels. Imports decreased already in 1975
- 1980 and then further in the eighties. Exports, on the
other hand, seemed to behave occasionally as a substitute
outlet for domestic production, because they achieved their
highest growth at a time when government and private con-
sumption as well as gross investment decreased significant-
ly. However, during the entire period under study exports
were rather depressed, showing negative rates in the early
1970s and a somewhat better performance in 1975 - 1980
followed by stagnation in the eighties.
To the extent that the success or failure of the policies
implemented in Peru are reflected in the evolution of real
income per capita, aggregate supply and aggregate demand the
net balance is more on the side of failure than of success,
even for the apparently healthy years from 1970 to 1975. The
key variables seem to have been investment and the foreign
sector. The strong expansion of investment - mostly govern-
ment investment - in the first half of the seventies ob-
viously did not contribute to a higher productivity and thus
neither to a higher income nor to an improved export basis.
A growing share of national income was consumed and not
saved, in an attempt to distribute a product which was stag-
nating in absolute terms and already falling in per capita
terms. Import demand for capital and intermediate goods be-
haved accordingly, with periods of expansion and contraction
subject to stop-and-go cycles in aggregate demand and
foreign exchange availability; imports of consumption goods
rose especially during the short period of liberalisation,
partly reflecting a lack of competitiveness of the local
manufacturing sector.- 9 -
The trade, agricultural and factor market policies had an
important impact on the sectoral structure of the economy.
As could be expected, the excessive inward-orientation
worked as a disincentive for the primary sector. Table 1 in
Appendix A shows that the share of GDP originating in agri-
culture and fishing decreased by 28 % from 1970 to 1980 and
recovered only slightly thereafter. Mining's share fell from
8.2 % in 1970 to 6.2 % in 1975 but climbed to 10 % during
the liberalisation phase, a level that could be maintained
until 1985. In contrast, manufacturing GDP, which consti-
tuted an important policy target, moved only very slowly:
manufacturing improved by a poor 4 % from 1970 to 1985.
Peru's share of manufacturing in GDP was the highest of all
Latin American countries in 1980 and, taking into account
the general tendency observed in this region's industriali-
zation pattern , seems to have reached "maturity" in the
late seventies, with further increases being unlikely.
The half-hearted land reform together with the interven-
tionist and profit-squeezing agricultural policies contri-
buted to a significant contraction of agricultural produc-
tion in the seventies, which, in turn, lead to widespread
un- and underemployment in rural areas. Employment statis-
tics for Peru are not known for their reliability but may at
least approximate the order of magnitude of the evolution of
employment opportunities in the agricultural sector. As
shown in Table A 2, employment (defined as adequately em-
ployed plus underemployed persons) in agriculture grew with
an average rate of 0.8 % p. a. in the seventies, whereas em-
ployment in the rest of economy, including public adminis-
tration and services, expanded six times faster. Agricul-
tural production seems to have revived in the eighties, with
Import substitution contributed to an accelerated expan-
sion of the manufacturing sectors in the early years.
After "easy" import substitution was exhausted, growth
slowed down and the sector eventually stagnated or even
contracted in some countries.- 10 -
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Source: Data: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics; own calculations.-li-
the rate of growth of employment again recovering, albeit
still remaining unable to catch up with the corresponding
rates for the growth of population and it's share of eco-
nomic active persons.
The role of agriculture in generating employment has always
been strategic in most developing countries and particularly
so in Peru. In 1985 agriculture still accounted for 37 % of
total employment, down from nearly 60 % in 1970, whereas
manufacturing's share stagnated at about 10 % over the whole
period from 1970 to 1985. With the said agricultural poli-
cies along with strong incentives toward investment in
physical capital in form of negative real interest rates, an
overvalued exchange rate and the Labour Stability Law, la-
bour market disequilibria could hardly be prevented. The
decline of agriculture induced the rural population to
migrate and to join the urban working poor. The excess
supply of unskilled labour resulted in the establishment of
a black informal labour market in the biggest cities and
especially in metropolitan Lima, where an important part of
national income originates. Although severe shortcomings in
national income statistics unfortunately do not even permit
a rough estimate of the real wage impact these policies had,
it can at least be hypothesised that traditional inequali-
ties in the functional distribution of income should have
been further exacerbated during the period under study. In
fact available data on domestic income published by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica show that the share of
wages and salaries in domestic income decreased from 40.5 %
in 1970 to around 36 % in 1980 and recovered only slowly
thereafter.
It would be wrong to infer from this that the winners can be
found on the side of private capital. Instead, as has been
concluded from the real indicators (Table 1) and as can
readily be seen from the monetary indicators (Tables 2 - 4),- 12 -
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Short-, medium- and long-term public and private foreign
debt;
Public and private short-term foreign debt;
Relative changes.
Source: Data: Instituto Nacional de Planificaci6n. Direc-
ci6n General de Planificaci6n Econ6mica, Series
Estadisticas Macroecon6micas Peru: 1970 - 1985,
Lima, September 1986; own calculations.- 14 -
labour and the private entrepreneurial sector have suffered
from persistent crowding out by an ever expanding public
sector. Government expenditure saw high growth rates in
nominal as well as in real terms in spite of a continually
growing budget deficit. The pattern since 1976 has been one
of alternating faster and slower expansions with occasional
contractions of the deficit, with the deficit's share in GDP
reaching 12.1 percent in 1983.
The public sector's demand for savings expanded at rates
which by far exceeded the ones achieved by overall economic
adtivity and was satisfied from both domestic and foreign
sources. In the early seventies domestic credit to the
public sector grew at double-digit average rates until the
late seventies, when it contracted for the first time, jump-
ing again in 1983 and finally resuming contraction toward
the mid 1980s. Heavy borrowing abroad by the government
began in 1972 and peaked in 1974; on average foreign public
debt rose particularly in the early seventies and continued
at fairly high levels throughout the whole period under
study.
Combined with an almost non existent local capital market
(FISCHER 1987) and a policy of maintaining a fixed nominal
exchange rate for several years in the early seventies an
expansion of the money supply of such an order cannot be
neutral with respect to the price level. It may not sur-
prise, therefore, that inflation as measured by the consumer
price index took a first two-digit jump from 1973 to 1974
and since then only twice proceeded with a rate lower than
the one prevailing the year before. Changes in the CPI
reached an average rate of 58.6 % p. a. in the eighties.
In the face of continually rising inflation pushed by exces-
sive public lending Peru practiced an exchange rate policy
designed to guarantee a (rationed) cheap dollar for impor-- 15 -
ters of capital and intermediate goods as well as food pro-
ducts and a dear dollar for financial capital inflows (main-
ly credits) . Adjustments to the nominal exchange rate began
in 1975. From 1976 to 1978 and then again from 1982 to 1984
devaluations exceeded the changes in the domestic CPI. In
all other years during this period the domestic currency was
overvalued with respect to the dollar (Table 3). This is
clearly reflected in the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the US
dollar, which depreciated from 1973 to 1978 and from 1982 to
1984, and appreciated during the liberalisation period. De-
valuations exceeding CPI inflation lead to depreciation of
the real exchange rate, while the opposite occurred when
devaluations remained under the rate of inflation. With a
certain time lag, the trade balance produced a textbook-like
surplus in the wake of a depreciating real exchange rate
and, similarly, a deficit following the appreciation or only
marginal depreciation of the real exchange rate.
It was precisely the exchange rate policy that neutralised
the potential benefits of liberalisation in 1979 - 1982. For
the first time the government had started to remove tariff
and non-tariff trade barriers achieving a decrease in effec-
tive protection of the manufacturing sector from a weighted
average level of 121.9 % in 1978 to 74.3 % in 1981
(Table 5). With the real exchange rate appreciating an im-
port boom ensued, which proved particularly harmful to the
uncompetitive Peruvian industry and thus paved the way for
another upturn in the demand for protection from local in-
dustry and unions. As can be seen from Table 5 not even one
single sector of the manufacturing industry was free of the
anti-export bias brought about by the combined effect of an
overvalued exchange rate and the tax on exports implied by
import protection. The massive subsidies offered to so-
The overvalued exchange rate for capital imports contri-
buted to distort the interest differential existing bet-
ween local and foreign credit.- 16 -
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tariff level, together with fiscal incentives for manufactured exports were estimated
to contribute to a 25 percent overvaluation
the hypothetical free trade rate;
of the exchange rate in 1981, compared with
Net effective protection rate for the domestic market plus 1 divided by the
ponding rate for exports plus 1.
corres-
Source: World Bank, Peru. The Manufacturing Sector: Performance and Policy Issues,
Uhpubl. Doc., Washington, July 22, 1983; UNIDO, Industrial Restructuring in
Peru: Policies for Growth and Development, Unpubl. Doc., Vienna, February 26,
1986: own calculations.- 17 -
called non-traditional exports (tax reimbursements (CERTEX)
and cheap export finance (FENT)) since the early seventies
and comparable to a disguised devaluation were uncapable of
rendering manufacturing exports profitable.
The economic development of Peru in the period from 1970 to
1985 can be summarised as one of accentuated inward orienta-
tion and incoherent policies. The only rather short libera-
lisation experience from 1979 to 1982 failed to bring about
a change in the inward orientation of economic policy: Some
trade barriers were dismantled but the overvalued exchange
rate was maintained along with relatively high levels of
public spending. As measured by GDP per capita, this indus-
trialisation strategy did not lead to higher but in fact to
a lower level of economic development (real GDP per capita
remained below the 1970 level from 1983 to 1985). Underlying
the closed-economy approach was a fundamental inconsistency
in the monetary sector of the economy: uncontrolled credit
demand by the public sector together with an unguided ex-
change rate policy . Some imbalances, though, are of an
institutional nature, as far as the labour market and pro-
perty rights in agriculture are concerned. Also, the Peru-
vian economy is occasionally exposed to climatic shocks ("El
Nino") with an adverse impact on some industries. However,
the overall picture clearly points toward recurring incon-
2
sistencies in domestic policy .
In this respect, the Peruvian case presents similarities
to the Argentine case. On this see Fernandez (1985).
This diagnosis of the Peruvian disease implied by the
analyses of the policy background and the major trends
determining Peru's economic performance is being formally
tested in Foders and Kirkpatrick (1987).- 18 -
III. The "New Heterodoxy"
1. Economic Policy in Peru since July 1985
The government that came ~ to power on July 28, 1985 almost
immediately implemented an economic policy package con-
sisting of
nominal wage hikes exceeding inflation, mainly for public
sector employees,
lower taxes and higher public expenditure,
nominal interest rate ceilings substantially lower than
the inflation rate (the nominal interest rate was reduced
gradually from 280 % in July 1985 to 40 % in June 1987),
a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the US dollar, after an
initial devaluation of 12 percent,
a freeze of consumer and producer prices, after minor ad-
justments in the relative prices,
higher tariff and nontariff barriers for manufactures and
- a limit to foreign debt service payments amounting to
10 % of export earnings.
This economic plan was called "heterodox" and considered to
be an adequate response to the deep economic crisis ex-
perienced in Peru since 1983. The response was based on a
particular perception of the crisis and its causes: The ex-
istence of tripple-digit inflation was not associated with
excess demand or excess money supply, but rather with cost-
push arguments. The domestic cost of capital was identified
as the main factor exerting pressure upon production costs,
The so-called "New Economic Policy" was disclosed in the
latest development plan 1986 - 1990 (Presidencia de la
Republica 1987); the measures taken by the new government
were published in "El Peruano".- 19 -
although the exchange rate was also blamed, to the extent
that devaluations lead to dearer imported capital and inter-
mediate goods. Excess demand was deemed impossible, due to
considerable idle capacity existing in the manufacturing
sector. Continuously increasing production costs were under-
stood to fuel inflationary expectations. The fact that ag-
gregate demand did not grow at acceptable rates was attri-
buted to both falling real wages, explained by insufficient
nominal wage adjustments, and severe cuts in public spending
by the outgoing government.
The exchange rate was assumed to be neutral with respect to
the balance of payments, i. e. with virtually no influence
on merchandise trade, services and capital flows. Therefore,
a fixed domestic price of the dollar was hypothesised to
have no negative effect on foreign currency reserves. On the
other hand, domestic credit, the other component of money
supply, was seen to have been restricted in the past, to the
point of imposing severe limits on future growth.
Since the government characterised the economic situation
prevailing in mid 1985 as one of recession-cum-inflation the
focus was on short-run disinflation and reactivation of the
economy. In the face of unused capacity investment would
play no central role at first. Consequently, in this view,
economic policy should bring about a rapid expansion of con-
sumption with its usual short-run impact on income and em-
ployment; the low level of capacity utilisation would pre-
vent any inflationary pressures. Existing inflation would be
curbed through price and exchange rate controls along with
low interest rate ceilings.
Before implementing strict price controls the government ad-
justed public utilities' prices as well as fuel and food
prices, in order to correct some of the long prevailing dis-
tortions of relative prices, but particularly to increase- 20 -
the relative prices of agricultural products. In 1987 the
system of controls was partly relaxed and a system of regu-
lar price monitoring came into being, although the original
intention of the new government had been to institutionalise
"concerted action" among government, industry and unions,
aiming at a social consensus in pricing matters. The latter
soon turned out to be unfeasible.
That money demand had developed in the direction of a signi-
ficant dollarisation of the economy was also acknowledged
by the new government. The classic functions of money as a
store of value and a unit of account were being satisfied by
the dollar and not by the sol; in many transactions the sol
had even lost its role as a medium of exchange. The govern-
ment attacked currency substitution by freezing dollar-de-
nominated deposits, at first for three months, and fixing
the official exchange rate at an overvalued level. At the
same time, a system of multiple exchange rates was created,
with a much less overvalued financial rate, the said offi-
cial rate and a legalised black or free rate. When dollar-
denominated deposits were again at the disposal of the
public they had to be converted to national currency at the
official rate. Investors were deterred from further currency
substitution because in the moment of purchasing dollars in
the free market with the proceeds from dollar deposits a
substantial loss was incurred. Furthermore, confidence in
the domestic currency was to be re-established by intro-
ducing a new currency, the inti, at a rate of 1,000 soles
per inti. Finally, starting January 1987 the fixed exchange
rate was substituted by a preannounced crawling peg, with
monthly devaluations of the official rate running at 2.2
percent.
Basically, the traditional Peruvian policy of highly sub-
sidising industry, both directly (credits from development
banks, subsidies for manufactured exports, import protec-- 21 -
tion) and indirectly (subsidies for agriculture to guarantee
low food prices, increased government procurement along with
higher public expenditure) was continued. In addition, two
employment programmes were initiated, one for public works
(PAIT) and one- for private industry (PROEM), and financed
from the budget. The Labour Stability Law was amended to
reduce the pre-tenure period of employment from three years
to three months, but also to allow for untenured short-run
contracts.
In an attempt to get hold of firms' savings, usually in-
vested in the local "informal capital market" at positive
real interest rates, an investment-employment fund was
created in 1987, this being one of the first medium-term
measures. The funds are to be raised from purchases of
government debt bonds by industry and earmarked to comple-
ment private investment at a rate of 1 inti for every 2 in-
tis invested by private companies. A follow up of this poli-
cy can also be seen in the nationalisation of a part of the
private system of financial intermediation, consisting of
some banks, insurance companies and investment firms belong-
ing to Peruvian nationals.
As far as fiscal policy is concerned, expenditure was re-
shuffled, the cuts occurring in long-run public investment,
defense spending, and particularly in public debt service
payments. On the other hand, subsidies and public consump-
tion expenditure were planned to increase.
2. The Economic Consequences of "Heterodoxy"
As measured by the evolution of the economic indicators for
Peru (Tables 6 and 7) on a quarterly basis the new govern-
ment's economic plan achieved price stabilisation and an im-
portant expansion of output during the period extending from
1985, third quarter, to 1986, fourth quarter. The quarterly- 22 -


























































































Money: currency outside banks plus private sector
Quasi-money: time, savings and foreign currency
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Source: Data: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics; own calculations.- 23 -
Table 7 - Evolution of
- 1986 (4)
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Source: Data: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics; own calculations.- 24 -
changes in the CPI fell from 30.5 % to 11.3 % in 1985, re-
maining virtually at that level in 1986. At the same time,
GDP grew at a rate of 8.5 % in real terms in 1986 (Banco
Central de Reserva del Peru 1987).
Domestic credit was drastically cut, with the relevant
growth rates decreasing 1985 and becoming negative in the
first quarter 1986. Negative rates were also faced by the
public sector, whereas the credit to the private sector con-
tinued at positive though much lower rates. Monetary aggre-
gates also followed this trend, but with the severe cuts in
the expansion of nominal money (Ml) occurring much later, in
the second quarter 1986. However, the short-lived truce in
the flow of credit to the public sector came to a halt al-
ready in the third quarter 1986; the monetary aggregates
returned to higher growth rates in the last quarter of that
year. Thus, on an annual basis, the decrease in credit
supply from 1985 to 1986 went almost unnoticed, if compared
with Peru's monetary history from 1970 to 1984. In fact the
changes in domestic money supply from 1985 to 1986 were in
some cases even higher as the ones prevailing in the early
seventies, and definitely much higher as the ones achieved
in 1984/85.
Price controls were obviously quite successful in attenu-
ating the link between money supply and the price level, as
measured by the official CPI, at least until December 1986,
although lower growth of domestic credit had been compen-
sated by significant changes in foreign currency reserves in
the second half of 1985. In spite of this, some effects of
these policies were already showing since 1985: The real
exchange rate appreciated significantly from 1985 to 1986
leading to negative export growth and higher imports and,
thus, to lower reserves.
Some of the figures for 1987 available at the time of writ-
ing this paper not only confirm the overall trend in domes-- 25 -
tic money supply observed in 1985 and 1986, but also indi-
cate a new upturn in the rate of inflation. The change in
the CPI in the first quarter 1987 reached 16.0 %, the
highest level since the second quarter 1985. Although in
January 1987 a preannounced crawling peg scheme was intro-
duced, the real exchange,rate kept on appreciating and the
deficit in the balance of merchandise trade increased
further in the first quarter (IMF 1987).
The dollarisation of the Peruvian economy could apparently
be stopped during 1986 but recovered it's former momentum in
the first months of 1987. This can be concluded from the
evolution of quasi-money, which includes foreign currency
deposits held by residents, in 1986, and from the develop-
ments in the domestic free dollar market in 1986/87. The
Central Bank at first opted for direct interventions in the
free dollar market aiming at a constant spread between the
official and the free rate. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts, it finally declared the free market illegal, in
order to obstruct any further increases in the premium.
As far as the impact of the "New Economic Policy" is re-
flected in the basic economic indicators, this short-run
approach was able to hide some of the more important
symptoms of the Peruvian crisis, at least until the end of
1986. However, the underlying causes have not been dealt
with yet. Instead, the performance of the Peruvian economy
since mid 1985 draws a picture of marginal changes, with the
fundamental imbalances remaining and, possibly, even
growing.
The economic plan implemented by the Peruvian government can
hardly constitute an appropriate answer to the Peruvian
crisis as identified in Section II.1 of this paper. The main
reason for this is that the policies implemented do not take
into account the fact that Peru is a small open economy sub-- 26 -
ject to external restrictions; these policies rather seem to
assume that this country resembles a virtually closed eco-
nomy. As measured by exports plus imports as a share of GDP
the openness of the Peruvian economy increased from 33.9 %
in 1970 to 44.6 % in 1980 and decreased to 37.4 % in 1985
(IMF 1986). The 1985 level of this indicator still clearly
points toward a substantial influence of trade on the eco-
nomic development of Peru.
The central inconsistency in the policy package can be seen
in an expansionary fiscal policy along with an accommodating
monetary policy which totally ignores external restrictions
as represented by the evolution of the real exchange rate.
In other words, an inherently open economy cannot be de-
linked from the world economy by a discretionary exchange
rate policy (supported by negative liberalisation), without
deepening already existing disequilibria in the domestic
economy and eventually adding new distortions.- 27 -
IV. "Orthodox" Versus "Heterodox" Plans: Policy Options for
Peru
The eighties have offered economists and policymakers a
varied country experience in the field of stabilisation.
Countries as Argentina, Brazil and Israel are good examples
of an heterodox approach to stabilisation, whereas Bolivia
presents an example of an orthodox approach. All these coun-
tries have in common that they attempted to stop high infla-
tion and at the same time had to face external debt pro-
blems. The Peruvian case fits very well into this picture.
What can we learn from these other experiences in order to
better understand the prospects of the Peruvian plan and
derive policy recommendations?
Behind inflation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Israel
was a growing budget deficit that in the end had to be fi-
nanced by central bank credit . Inflation was repressed the
heterodox way by preventing further movements in the price
level by specific wage, price and exchange rate controls and
cutting public spending as far as political constraints
allowed. Although initially currency devaluations along with
mild budget cuts and a package of controls achieved signifi-
cant disinflation at low output cost, the lesson is that a
stabilised price level can only be maintained in the medium
run if the underlying fiscal imbalance is removed. For the
latter, increases in public sector prices, lower nominal
wage adjustments in the public sector, subsidy cuts and a
realistic pace of external public debt servicing are neces-
sary. In some countries other expenditure categories (de-
fense) might be included in this list while in others a tax
reform might help broaden the revenue base.
For an analysis of stabilisation plans in these countries
the reader is referred to FISCHER, HIEMENZ and TRAPP
(1985) and HEYMANN (1987) (Argentina), SACHS (1987)
(Bolivia), CARDOSO and DORNBUSCH (1987) (Brazil) and
FISHER (1987) (Israel).- 28 -
In Argentina and Brazil public expenditure continued growing
in the belief that global demand management and a moderate
incomes policy would prevent real wage losses at only low
employment cost. In Israel defense spending could not be
significantly reduced for political reasons and nominal wage
hikes reflecting the power of labour unions were well above
the target rates. Servicing of external debt was continued
by these countries as a means to retain their ability to
borrow abroad and negotiate favourable debt rescheduling
terms. In all cases short-run disinflation did not last. New
inflationary pressures could not be contained, mainly due to
political constraints on economic policy.
The Bolivian experience, in contrast, shows that if politi-
cal support to end (hyper)inflation (Bolivia had one of
highest rates in history) can be found, inflation can be ab-
ruptly brought down, even from the heights of four- and
five-digit rates of price increase, at reasonable social
cost. The measures adopted were a major devaluation together
with radical budget cuts and a tax reform. Further, internal
price controls were relaxed and the foreign exchange market
began to be deregulated for both trade and financial capital
transactions. The effect of this plan was an immediate
stabilisation of the price level, despite substantial in-
creases in the prices of public goods. Inflation came down
from 20 000 % in mid 1985 to an average rate of 100 % in
1986 and could be maintained at this level thereafter.
From this short account of heterodox and orthodox stabili-
sation plans the following conclusions can be drawn: Stabi-
lisation has been achieved the heterodox as well as the or-
thodox way virtually by cutting central bank credit to the
government and avoiding an overvaluation of the exchange
rate. The difference between the heterodox and the orthodox
approach being the size of the budget cut involved.- 29 -
As regards the ability of both approaches to reach the sta-
bilisation goal there seems to be almost no difference in
the short run. In the longer run, however, orthodox policies
seem to be able to maintain price stability while heterodox
policies tend to loose their power over time. Much more
could be said about these-approaches if their sensitivity to
alternative timing and sequencing schemes were known. Simi-
larly, the extent to which credibility can be attained
should influence the outcome of either plan. The behaviour
of expectations after a change in the regime has occurred,
in either direction, also remains to be studied closely.
Finally, it should be noted that there is a link between
stabilisation and liberalisation. The orthodox package in-
cludes liberalisation as well, whereas heterodox policies
are based on controls and regulations.
In the case of Peru a heterodox policy package was success-
ful in stabilising the price level in the period July 1985 -
December 1986. Economic indicators presented in Section III
of this paper clearly point toward a revival of inflation
since December 1986. Domestic credit to the government again
started to expand and the overvaluation of the domestic
currency belongs to the policy targets of the Peruvian eco-
nomic plan. Output expansion reached an above-average rate
in 1986 but the forecast for 1987 does not meet even half
the 1985/86 rate. If this picture is confronted with the
international experience in stabilisation referred to above,
the conclusion would be that the prospects for long-run
stabilisation of the price level are very dim in Peru, un-
less a new policy reform is carried out.
Given the long prevailing distortions of the Peruvian eco-
nomy, reflected in a tendency toward low growth rates of GDP
or even negative growth rates of GPD per capita, thereby
showing a lack of profitable investment opportunities, Peru
could probably reap substantial gains from liberalisation of- 30 -
key markets accompanied by a coherent stabilisation package
and a sound proposal to deal with the external debt problem.
Liberalisation in Peru would have to include the trade re-
gime and the factor markets. A switch from an inward-orient-
ed to an outward-looking trade regime would favour the de-
velopment of a competitive industrial base. Removal of in-
terest rate ceilings would contribute to a deregulation of
the domestic capital market and create incentives for the
mobilisation of internal savings. A liberalisation of the
labour market would mean to end the discrimination implied
by the Labour Stability Law. Deregulation on both factor
markets together with a realistic exchange rate policy would
help industry adjust to the challenges of the world markets
by adopting labour intensive lines of production. A reform
of property rights in agricultural land would lead to an
efficient allocation of land, thereby paving the way for
higher productivity in agriculture; this would have to be
matched by a decontrol of producer and consumer prices of
agricultural products.
Many of the distortions existing in the real sector of the
Peruvian economy could be much better dealt with in the con-
text of price stability. Taking into account that what is
needed is a combined liberalisation-cum-stabilisation ap-
proach, the Peruvian case seems to be calling for a stabili-
sation plan along the lines of the orthodox package. The
implementation of another plan of the heterodox family would
at best perpetuate the imbalances existing today; in the
long run the economy could possibly return to tripple-digit
inflation with slow growth.- 31 -
Appendix A: Tables- 32 -
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100.0
Source: Comisi6n Econ6mica Para America Latina, Series
Hist6ricas and Anuario Estadistico de America La-
tina; own calculations.
Table A 2 - Evolution of Employment 1970 - 1985
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